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Abstract  
In the less than 70 years since Korean liberation, Korea has grown to be 
one of the world’s top five ship-owning countries in 2014. This can be 
attributed to a few factors such as government policy, Korea Shipping 
Corporation (KSC, hereafter) and merchant marine officers. This paper will 
expound the true motivations of the establishment and the privatization of 
KSC in 1950 and in 1968, respectively. KSC, as Korea’s national shipping 
company, sailed along a very unusual course of development. It was 
established in 1950 not to foster and develop Korea’s shipping industry but to 
help alleviate the financial burdens of the fledgling Korean government. The 
main cause of privatizing KSC in 1968 was a purely political decision, not an 
economic one as it overlapped with the rapid growth period of the shipping 
industry in the world, as well as in Korea. In sum, KSC, a state-run enterprise, 
was a bane in the short run but a boon in the long run for both the Korean 
government and Korea’s shipping industry. If we can believe KSC followed 
the ordinary sailing route as a state-run enterprise, we might develop a new 
opinion that the national shipping company might be a financial burden in a 
short period, but various benefits over a long period. 
Key Words : National Company, State-Run Enterprise, Korea Shipping 
Corporation (KSC), Laissez Faire, Shipping Policy, National Economy  
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I. Introduction 
The growth of the Korean shipping industry spans almost 70 years since 
1945. According to UNCTAD, the number of vessels owned and operated 
by Korean companies in 2014 was 1,568 vessels with 78,240,000 DWT 
GT (over 1,000 GT), placing Korea as the 5th largest shipping power in the 
world. Some people may well suppose that a national or state-owned 
shipping company would take a leading role in boosting the development 
of the Korean shipping industry such as China does nowadays. It was, 
however, in 1968 when the only national shipping company in Korea was 
privatized. Since that year, private companies have played a decisive role 
in the progress of Korea’s shipping industry. Surely, the private shipping 
companies have benefited from the various shipping policies such as cargo 
preference, cargo reserve, taxation, and shipbuilding subsidies from the 
government until 1996 when Korea became a member of OECD.  
There was a national shipping company of KSC from 1950 to 1968. Most 
people knowledgeable of Korea’s shipping industry acknowledge the 
importance of the role played by KSC in developing Korea’s shipping 
industry at the initial stage of the Korean economy. Nevertheless, research on 
the history of KSC is scant up till now, except that by Sohn, Yoon, Korea 
Maritime Research Institute, and Hanjin Shipping. Though it is not difficult to 
grasp the story of KSC in a full scale from its foundation in 1950 to the 
privatization in 1968 from these works, two important questions still remain 
to be answered.  They are (1) why did Korea found KSC as a national 
shipping company in 1950, only one year after the establishment of the 
government? (2) Why was KSC privatized in 1968, which coincided with the 
period of the accelerated growth of shipping industry in Korea? 
This paper will explore the above two questions by analyzing the 
historical proceedings and minutes of the National Assembly concerning 
KSC. The National Assembly documents embrace the critics, comments, 
remarks and statements discussed in the National Assembly of Korea. 
Therefore, we can clearly catch the atmosphere and mood of the period 
from these historical manuscripts. For this, sections 2 and 3 review the 
literature and theories on the role of the nation and of national shipping 
company for the development of the economy and the countries’ shipping 
industry. Section 4 highlights the rise and fall of KSC through an analysis 
of proceedings and minutes in order to disclose the true backgrounds of 
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the foundation and privatization of KSC. The final chapter summarizes the 
contributions that KSC made to the shipping industry in Korea.  
II. Literature Review 
Several original documents are available such as management reports 
and the in-house bulletin ‘Haegong’ from 1952 to 1978, KSC Statistics 
while there are also a few books on the history of KSC. The 10 year 
History of the Korean Shipping, 1945-55 was published by The Bureau of 
Shipping and was the first document that described such detailed 
information on KSC as business performance, cargo shipments and 
tonnages from 1950 to 1954. In 1973, Ki-sun Yoon, ex-general director of 
The Bureau of Shipping, described the progress from the foundation to the 
privatization of KSC in his book The 25 year History of the Korean 
Shipping. He summarized the defects in and contribution of KSC to the 
development of the Korean shipping industry.  
Tae-hyun Sohn(1997) conducted a systematic analysis of the story of 
KSC academically for the first time. Sohn presented the detailed 
information on the increase of tonnages, the expansion of sailing routes, 
profits and losses, the growth of capital stock, and the contributions and 
short-comings of KSC as a state-run corporation. He appraised 
affirmatively that KSC made profits except for only three quarters, 
improved the composition of the fleets, expanded the trade routes from the 
coastal to the ocean-going, and increased the capital stocks. Nevertheless, 
Sohn did not overlook caveats that these affirmative successes could have 
included the biases such as Ł  profit by the state-favors such as 
non-dividend for state-own stock of 80% and income tax exemption; ł
the expansion of routes following the development of the Korean 
economy; Ń the improvement of the fleets after 1964 just before its 
privatization(Sohn, 1997). 
According to Alexander Gerschenkron, industrialization is characterized 
by a sudden acceleration or great spurts of economic growth. 
Gerschenkron argues underdeveloped countries may succeed in the 
process of industrialization by borrowing the sources of technical 
assistance, skilled labor, and capital goods from advanced countries(Lee, 
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1996, p.8). Tae-woo Lee (1996) applied the Gerschenkron model to the 
Korean shipping industry for the period of 1962-1981 which coincided 
with the period of rapid growth. He confirmed that the Korean shipping 
industry experienced two great spurts in 1967 and in 1975, respectively 
and had the advantage of relative backwardness and substituted for some 
missing prerequisites. Lee concluded that in the Korean shipping industry, 
various tax exemptions and direct and indirect subsidies, the government 
financed shipbuilding program (‘Keihek Zoseon’) and BBCPO (bare-boat 
charter with purchase option) functioned as the source of capital goods, 
anti-Japanese nationalism, Confucianism and anti-Communism as the 
ideologies, and a maritime educational institution as the source of skilled 
labor for fostering the Korean ocean-going fleets respectively(Lee, 1996). 
Although Lee mentioned that the government-owned corporation “KSC 
provided opportunities through which ex-seagoing officers were able to 
accumulate know-how of the shipping business and management in the 
1950s and 1960s(Lee, 1996, p.92),” he failed to consider the role KSC 
played in the development of the Korean shipping industry. The starting 
year of his study is 1962 which was the first year of the Five Year 
Economic Development Plans in Korea. With the implementation of the 
Plans, the Korean economy experienced rapid growth. That’s why Lee 
chose 1962 as the staring year of his analysis and excluded KSC as one of 
main factors for the growth of Korea’s shipping industry. 
Two books on the history of KSC were published in 2001 and 2010, 
respectively. A History of KSC, published by Korea Maritime Research 
Institute in 2001, described the pre-history before 1950, the stories of 
state-owned KSC from 1950 to 1968 and privatized KSC from 1968 to 
1987 respectively. This book offers us 1̺  the full story of KSC from its 
pre-history from 1912 to 1949; 2̺  the history of a national shipping 
company from 1950 to 1968, and 3̺  the development of the privatized 
company from 1968 to 1988. Hanjin Shipping Ȓ History of 60 Years,
published by Hanjin Shipping in 2010, covered the history of KSC from 
1950 to 1968, as an early period of the 60 year history of Hanjin Shipping
which was merged with the privatized KSC (renamed as K.S. Line) in 
November 1987. This book contains the detailed story of KSC as the 
previous company of Hanjin Shipping and statistics on the fleets, cargo 
transport performance, and profits and losses. With these two books, we 
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can get sufficient information on the history and statistics of KSC. 
Nevertheless, we cannot catch the real background story surrounding the 
foundation of KSC immediately after the establishment of the government 
and of the privatization during the years of rapid growth of the Korean 
shipping industry. Such deficiencies justify the reason why an analysis of 
the proceedings and minutes of the National Assembly are needed.  
III. Theories on the Roles of the State-run Enterprise
1. Neo- Liberalism and Freedom of Marketplace 
The 1980s were characterized by Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and the 
culmination of Neo-liberalism, which means that the Keynesian way on 
the role of the state was obviously drawing to a close(Harvey, 2008, p.23). 
Neo-liberalism gained its social status in 1974 and 1976 when Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences respectively. Thatcher and Reagan were in power in the UK from 
1979 to 1990 and the US from 1981 to 1989. They formed national 
policies based on Neo-liberalism. They strongly implemented policies on 
social welfare budget cuts, tax reductions, the privatization of national and 
public companies, deregulations, and restrictions of labor unions. 
Harvey describes the main characteristics of Neo-Liberalism as the 
freedom of marketplace and trade. The Neo-liberal state’s slogan is 
flexibility, which exaggerates the merits of competition, but in fact it 
opens the marketplace to centralized capital and monopolistic 
authority(Harvey, 2008, pp.41 & 43). The formation of the WTO in 1995 
was the culmination of reforming the international organizations for  
Neo-liberalism. Their main aim is to open most of the world for capital to 
flow without any hindrance(Harvey, 2008, p.53). China and Russia, the 
two representative socialistic states, became members of the WTO in 2001 
and 2012 respectively. This suggests free competition seems to be an 
irreversible trend.  
Two recent distinctive trends in relation to policy-making are 
privatization and globalization(Kumar et al., 2008). It is well known that 
national companies suffer from such defects as inefficient management, 
lack of innovation and rigid personnel structure compared with private 
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companies. Nevertheless, many underdeveloped and developing countries, 
sometimes developed countries, still maintain national and public 
companies in the various areas, especially in the fields of infrastructure 
such as railways, underground, highways, airports and ports.  
2. State-owned enterprise in the Most Competitive Business 
The Shipping industry is one of the most competitive and international 
businesses. Michael Roe (2002) mentioned that ‘the shipping sectors have 
seen a considerable move towards private ownership’(p.504). With the 
adaptation of the open registry system in the second half of the 20th 
century, the role of flag fleets has declined dramatically. Sletmo (2002) 
wrote that “shipping policy in its traditional form based on perceived 
national needs and aims at maximizing the size of national fleets through 
promotional and protectionist means should be dead(p.477).” He added 
that “today, most but by no means all state owned companies, apart from 
small liners serving domestic market, have disappeared or exist on paper 
only(p.479).” Nonetheless, there are still many state-owned shipping 
companies operating in the shipping market, especially in liner and energy 
transportation areas. Some nations still run and operate their own national 
shipping companies such as COSCO of China, MISC of Malaysia, NOL of 
Singapore, and others even in the age of globalization and privatization. 
Even today the concept of “trade follows the flag” is often taken to be 
self-evident(Sletmo, 2002, p.474). 
The fact there are still many national shipping liners implies that there is 
still something remaining for the national shipping companies to 
contribute to the development of national economies, regardless of their 
economies development status. Goss and Marlow list the theories of 
defending maritime policies as (1) the infant industry argument, (2) 
developing new industries in developing countries, (3) shipping capacity 
needed to carry trade, (4) contribution to balance of payments, (5) defense 
purposes, and (6) needs to be present at international organization in order 
to attend for international policy decisions. In short, they argue the fallacy 
of each of these 6 propositions as follows; “There have been so many 
errors in so many governments’ policies towards shipping, and they have 
generally combined such high expense with such limited 
effectiveness(Goss and Marlow, 1993, p.63, and Sletmo, 2002, p.475).” In 
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contrast, Iheduru (1996) supports the role of national shipping companies 
to the national economy. He says, “The maritime sector has… become a 
major source of the conflict between the North and the South. Shipping is, 
therefore, one clear example of the efforts of the weak to change the 
international system in their favor(p.21).” 
Shipping policy may include promotional as well as regulatory and 
protectionist activities. Min (1973) says that “the state-owned fleet is a 
kind of in-direct subsidy because operating losses should be covered by 
the national budget(p.547).” This paper, however, argues that the 
state-owned shipping company is a kind of direct and extreme promotional 
shipping policy. As mentioned above, in the midst of a seemingly globally 
irreversible trend of free competition and privatization there are still many 
state-owned fleets in the global shipping markets with their supporters 
inside and outside of the shipping industry. KSC is one of the most 
suitable examples to prove whether the state-owned fleets can contribute 
to the development of a nation at its early stage or not. 
IV. Rise and Fall of Korea Shipping Corporation, 1950-1968 
In this section, two main questions will be answered by analyzing the 
proceedings and minutes of the National Assembly of Korea. The author 
found one discussion on the foundation of KSC as a national shipping 
company in 1949 just before establishing KSC and eight inspections and 
audits by the National Assembly from 1950 to 1968. By analyzing these 
historical manuscripts, two questions can be solved. First, let’s try to 
reveal the real background of the founding of KSC as a national company.
1. Real Background of Establishing KSC, 1950 
According to the Special Act for establishing KSC as a national 
company enforced on October 8, 1949, KSC was established ‘in order to 
promote and develop shipping industry through carrying out the national 
policy concerning shipping business as a limited corporation’ (clause 1). 
This clause shows that KSC was founded as a state-run shipping 
corporation, but the special act itself did not contain any clause on the 
main purpose of establishing KSC. The real intention of establishing KSC 
was found in the minutes of the 5th provisionary meeting of the National 
A State-Run Enterprise : A Bane or a Boon?- A Case of the Korean Shipping Corporation, 1950-1968 
392G
G
Assembly dated on September 20, 1949. Mr. Jin-hong Yoo, a member of 
parliament, premised that “Shipping industry in the early stage of the 
Korean government is very important and an extremely pressing business” 
and made a comment on the special act for founding KSC as following; 
“KSC is to be established and become independent to lighten the burden of the 
Ministry of Transportation which has taken over all the deficit of Chosun 
Wooseon(ex-KSC). Therefore, the purpose of KSC serving for the national 
development sacrificially should be coded in the special act(Sept. 20, 1949).” 
On this comment, Mr. Jeong Huh, Minister of the Transportation, 
replied as follows; “Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transportation has 
managed shipping activity by itself. As the Ministry of Transportation 
conducts the administration and management of shipping at the same time, 
it has revealed various inconveniences and flaws. In one year 1949 only, 
Chosun Wooseon made a deficit of 500 million old Korean Won in the 
national budget. If KSC of semi-government and semi-private were 
established to manage the shipping business separating from 
administration, it might be enough to make a deficit of around 100 – 200 
million old Korean Won per year(Sept. 20, 1949).”
Sohn(1997) summarized the background of the foundation of KSC in 
the similar context as below; (1) Korea maritime seafarers and 
administrators realized that shipping is an important industry from a 
national perspective. (2) The Ministry of Transportation reflected the bad 
result under direct state management and evaluated the good performance 
of Chosun Wooseon positively under private participation. (3) 
Government assessed and realized the specialized knowledge and 
experience on shipping. According to Sohn’s analysis, “the ethos of 
shipping related people after the Liberation continued to establish KSC as 
a national company at the early stage of the fledgling Korean 
government(p.348).” According to Sohn, only a small numbers of the 
Korean merchant marine officers had the ethos that shipping must not be 
the object of private interests and shared the sense of duty for dedicating to 
the development of Korea’s shipping industry just after Korea’s Liberation 
in 1945. This materialized in the taking over of Chosun Wooseon after the 
Japanese retreated to their islands in August 1945, and managing the 
shipping company very successfully(p.329).
On the other hand, Mr. Yong-ju Kim(1984), general-manager 
(1945-1949) of Chosun Wooseon, appointed by both the US military 
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government and the Korean government and the first chief executive 
(1950-1952) of KSC, recalled a story in his Memoirs as follows; “The 
ministry of transportation operated about 20 US-transferred military ships 
directly for one year and made a great deficit of 3 billion old Korean Won 
which was a very serious issue in the National Assembly. So, Mr. Huh 
suggested me to take over and deploy these ships as the tonnages of 
Chosun Wooseon. But considering the great capital demand and the 
indispensable national support for managing the shipping company, I 
counter-proposed him to establish a semi-government shipping 
company(Kim, 1984, pp.103-104).” 
His statement was consistent with Mr. Huh’s statement afterward on the 
establishment of KSC. Mr. Huh (1980 & 2002) mentioned that “as 
state-run shipping activity resulted in a considerable loss as expected 
owing to the lack of flexibility and adaptability, the Ministry of 
Transportation could not choose but reform the direct control of shipping 
and establish KSC as a semi-government company(Monthly Maritime 
Korea, January 2002, p.161).” In reality, Chosun Wooseon (ex-KSC) 
which was managed by shipping specialists had a surplus except for the 
period of October 1945 to March 1947, as seen Table 1.  
<Table 1> Management performance of Chosun Wooseon, 1945-1949 
Term Period Profit and Loss(old Won) 
1 Oct. 1, 1945 – Mar. 31, 1947 - 1,622,000 
2 Apr. 1, 1947 – Sept. 30, 1947 + 8,868,000 
3 Oct. 1, 1947 – Mar. 31, 1948 + 1,049,000 
4 Apr. 1, 1948 – Sept. 30, 1948 + 1,200,000 
5 Oct. 1, 1948 – Mar. 31, 1949 + 2,093,000 
6 Apr. 1, 1949 – Sept. 30, 1949 + 10,000,000* 
Source : Brief History of KSC and Summary(Haegong Yeonhyuck-gwa Gaeyo), p.23;   
cited from Sohn(1997), p.336.  
Remark : estimated figure 
Mr. Doo-ok Seok, executive director of Chosun Wooseon (1946-47) 
and KSC (1950-1952) and the sixth chief executive (1960-1961) of KSC, 
referred in more detail on the foundation of KSC in his old days. 
According to his Memoire(1990), Mr. Yong-ju Kim, his senior at that time, 
had an intention to purchase Chosun Wooseon and to take over the 
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state-owned fleets from the government and manage those as the fleets 
under one company and to return those to the government if it did not 
work out well. On this idea, he gave his opinion that it must be inevitable 
for those to make a loss with the composition of old non-economical fleets. 
Mr. Seok suggested his boss Mr. Yong-ju Kim to manage one big shipping 
company as a state-policy corporation with the fleets of Chosun Wooseon 
and the government-owned ships in 1948. Mr. Seok, called up one month 
later by Mr. Huh (Minister of Transportation), explained the idea of the 
disposal of Chosun Wooseon and state-owned tonnages. Mr. Huh said this 
was a very good idea and asked him to keep it secret. The Special Act for 
founding KSC was enacted in September 1949(Seok’s Reminiscence).  
From the above, it reveals that the real purpose of founding KSC as a 
state-owned shipping corporation was to reduce the financial burden for 
the newborn Korean government rather than to foster and promote the 
shipping industry. From the very early stage of its establishment, people 
concerned including the Minister of Transportation and the chief executive 
of KSC knew this fact, but most of people in the Korean shipping society 
afterwards consider that KSC was established to develop the shipping 
industry through the national protective and promotional policy. This 
mutually contradicting phenomenon was mainly as a result from the wide 
spread of its Prospectus published in two books, The 10 year History of 
the Korean Shipping, 1945-55 (Haewoon 10 Nyeon Yaksa) in 1955 and 
The 25 year History of the Korean Shipping in 1973. The Prospectus in 
November 1949 stated the purpose of establishing KSC as a national 
shipping company as below; “In consideration of geographical and 
economic conditions, it is our keen task to rehabilitate the devastated 
national economy and to promote the people’s spirit of overseas expansion 
through aiming to be the shipping nation and developing the shipping as a 
national policy. Unfortunately it is extremely deplorable to see the current 
situation of our shipping… It is to establish KSC as a special corporation 
of semi-government which will combine the protective and promotional 
policy of shipping by the government and the private entrepreneurial spirit 
according to the special act.” 
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<Table 2> Tonnages of KSC as of January 1950 
Chosun Wooseon’s 
vessels 
State-owned 
vessels*
Total 
Number 6 21 27 
GT(average GT) 10,646 (1,774.3) 26,850 (1,278.6) 37,496 
DWT(average DWT) 17,785 (2,964.2) 30,305 (1,443.1) 48,090 
Average Ships’ Age 10.5** 8.2***
Source : Haewoon 10 Nyeon Yaksa, pp.344-345; 1949-2009 Hanjin Shipping · History of 60  
  Years, Data, pp.152-155. 
 Remark : * It included 12 US-transferred ships. 
         ** ‘Pyeongan’ was built in 1917 and the others between 1941 and 1945. 
             *** ‘Seoul’ was built in 1910 and the others between 1941 and 1945. 
2. Privatization of KSC, 1968
G
As revealed in the above section, the Korean government did not have 
any intention of keeping KSC as a state-owned corporation for a long time. 
The Special Act prescribed that “KSC exists for 50 months since its 
foundation” (clause 5), which means KSC had to be privatized at the time 
of March 1955. But the Korean government changed the corporate entity 
of KSC from the state-run corporation under the Special Act to the 
national shipping corporation under the Commercial Act in October 1957. 
KSC kept its entity as a national shipping corporation until 1968. 
KSC made deficits since its foundation. In reality, KSC could not break 
even or generate profits without the financial support from the government. 
It caused serious parliamentary disputes when the Korean government 
submitted the Act for transforming the legal entity of KSC from the 
state-run national corporation under the Special Act to the national 
shipping corporation under the Commercial Act in September 1957. 
People who were members of the ruling party and government officials 
emphasized the inevitability of KSC changing to a commercial company 
in order to avoid the financial burden for the government. For instance, Mr. 
Byung-gyu Cheon, vice-Minister of Finance, explained the reasons for 
repealing the Special Act, “it was true that KSC made losses meanwhile” 
and “expected KSC would get better after transforming it to the 
commercial shipping company,” and Mr. Young-eon Lee, the chairperson 
of the Committee of Commerce and Industry of the National Assembly, 
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stated that “it caused a great burden to the government’s budget relative to 
the scale of our national finance and banking(26th Ordinary Session, Sept. 
12, 1957).” Mr. Joon Jeong, an MP of the ruling party, supported the 
proposal and remarked that “KSC as a national company did not generate 
any positive effect and spent a great deal of the state property and caused 
considerable damages to our people.” These remarks proved that KSC 
made losses, rather than profits. Mr. Jae-gon Kim, an MP of the opposition 
party and an ex-master mariner, placed an emphasis on “that KSC could 
continue to exist till now was thanks not to the good management by the 
board of directors but to bleeding protections by the government(26th Ordinary 
Session, Sept. 13, 1957).” After sharp debates on the pros and cons, KSC was 
finally transformed to a limited company under the commercial act on October 5, 
1957. But the government still held 80% of the total shares. 
KSC Limited had to continue acquiring the tonnages after it being 
transformed as a national commercial shipping company in 1957. As a 
result, KSC was able to possess 23 vessels, 114,168 GT (168,282 DWT) in 
March 1968, right before its privatization. But the quality of the tonnages 
was not improved but rather deteriorated. The average of ships’ ages 
among 23 vessels was 17 years, and 15 vessels were over 20 years old. So, 
KSC had to request to the government nearly every year for financial 
support to purchase second-hand vessels. Notwithstanding the Arne 
Larsson & Company Scandal through the years of 1962 to 1965, KSC 
finally purchased 4 vessels, 30,529 GT (45,383 DWT) only with 
government investment in 1965.  
Even though KSC had to prepare for its privatization as a result of 
transforming its corporate entity as a national commercial shipping 
company since 1957, there was no one who would be able to take over the 
majority of the company’s shares due to its massive scale. Accordingly, 
KSC revised its article to be supervised by government on January 8, 1961 
until it could be privatized. Meanwhile, KSC reported the management 
condition and requested financial and political support for purchasing 
vessels and helping its management from the National Assembly and the 
administration. This led to the enacting of ‘the Act for promoting the 
shipping industry’ on February 28, 1968 under the military government. 
The military government decided to privatize nine state-run companies 
including KSC, Korea Shipbuilding Corporation, and Korea Express 
Corporation in 1967. After the social controversy, the Ministry of Finance 
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announced the privatization plans for the state-run companies on April 15, 
1968. It is quite interesting that there was no issue with the National Assembly in 
regards to privatizing KSC and other state-run companies. This might be the 
result of the oppressive atmosphere under the military government. 
Only one remark was found in the Proceedings and Minutes, in which 
Mr. Ki-taek Lee, an MP of the opposition party, critically mentioned ;
“The most serious problem for KSC to confront is to have too much debt of 
4,000 million Won comparing its gross capital of 1,500 million Won only. I 
suppose KSC is in a critical condition with the very low rate of profits…What 
is your plans to develop the shipping industry after privatization?” On this 
Maeng-ki Lee, the last chief executive of KSC, replied; “KSC can 
reimburse loans mainly due to its long term low interest rate because it 
can make a profit by managing the company…There might be merits 
and demerits if KSC is to be remained a national company or to be 
privatized. There might be enough time to be privatized hereafter and 
could overcome various difficulties meanwhile(65th Session, April 22, 1968).”
On the contrary to the KSC CEO’s expectation, the Korean government 
sold its share of 200,000 stocks to the public and reduced its ownership to 
47.5%, from 61.8%, on July 11, 1968. A few months later, all the shares 
owned by the government were sold to Lyun-joon Kim, the founder of 
Hanyang University, on November 11, 1968, and KSC was finally fully 
privatized. KSC’s privatization made us perplexed once again in light of 
the following two facts; (1) KSC made real profits from 1965 to 1967. (2) 
That was the booming period of the shipping industry in the world and 
also in Korea (see Figure 1). The main reason why the military 
government privatized KSC in spite of its very promising condition was 
mainly due to a political decision.  
The government announced construction of the 2nd oil refinery complex 
in Yeosu, Jeonnam Province for which several competitors including GS, 
Hanhwa, Samyang and Hanyang had been lobbying to the political power 
group of the ruling party. GS finally was selected as the contractor in 
November 1966. The political power group who had been bribed could not 
choose but offer preferential options for the losing strong competitors to 
purchase one of the state-run companies with favorable terms and 
conditions. That’s why a baritone singer and composer Lyun-joon Kim 
was able to take over the management right of KSC. Of course, this 
privatization caused controversy over the preferential support. According 
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to the reminiscence of Jae-soo Choi(KMRI, 2001), the general director of 
the division of Ocean-going Shipping of the Korea Maritime and Port 
Administration at that time, “Ministry of Finance made a written-promise 
to offer the underwriter (Lyun-joon Kim) the long-term loan without 
interest(p.248).” In short, the privatization of KSC was resulted from the 
political background, rather than the rationalization of the management or 
the development of KSC itself or national shipping industry.
<Figure 1> Shipping index and Korean fleet (1960 = 100, GT : 1,000) 
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Source : 1. Gross Tonnage of Korean Fleet: Sohn(1997), p.376. 
       2. Shipping Index: London Shipping Exchange; cited from Proceedings & Minutes   
No 4(April 22), 1968. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
As analyzed in the previous sections, KSC, as a national shipping 
company of Korea, navigated along a very unusual course in its 
development. It was established in 1950 not for fostering and developing 
Korea’s shipping industry but for reducing the financial burden on the 
fledgling Korean government. And the main causes of privatizing KSC 
resulted from a political decision, rather than from economic 
considerations in 1968 since this time coincided with the time of the rapid 
growth of the shipping industry in the world and Korea. In sum, the 
foundation and privatization of KSC were caused by the political 
motivations. That’s why KSC inevitably made deficits, except in the last 
few years of its identity.   
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<Table 3> KSC’s share of the Korean ocean-going vessels 
KSC Non-KSC 
Number GT Share Number GT Share 
1950 32 52,782 100 % 0 0 0 
1954 20 53,618 79 % 8 14,333 21 % 
1960 18 66,299 59 % 28 45,527 41 % 
1965 23 101,429 53 % 55 90,122 47 % 
1968 19 108,886 23 % 68 360,581* 73 % 
 Source :  1. 1950 & 1954: Kim, Jae-seung(2004), pp.179, 192-194. 
          2. 1960 & 1965: Proceeding & Minutes No.5(Feb. 4, 1966), p.5.  
          3. 1968: 30 Year History of the Korea Shipowners’ Association, p.182. 
Remark : * Mainly due to Pan Ocean Shipping Co. being founded in 1966 with  
           tonnages of 120,441 GT.  
Nonetheless, KSC was not merely a burden on the Korean government 
and its people. In fact, KSC had made significant contributions to the 
development of the national economy and the shipping industry in Korea. 
From the perspective of physical contribution, KSC possessed an 
overwhelming majority of the ocean-going vessels in Korea (see Table 3) 
and managed to transport politically sensitive cargo such as military 
supplies during the Korean War, fertilizers and coal and to carry out 
seaborne trade. Furthermore, KSC earned a considerable amount of 
foreign exchange, as evidenced in the Proceedings and Minutes of the 
National Assembly (Feb. 4, 1964 & April 22, 1968). For instance, KSC 
earned 2 million US dollars of freight income, which was equivalent to 18 
million US dollars of the national export in 1955, and in 1960, 2.5 million 
US dollars of freight income, comparable to 32.8 million US dollars of the 
national export(KMPA, 1980, p.390). 
More importantly KSC functioned as a platform of a training center for 
shipping personnel. Korea Lines Corporation was established in 1968 by 
Maeng-ki Lee(ex-CEO of KSC), KSS Line in 1969 by Jong-gyu 
Park(ex-manager of KSC), and Dooyang Shipping in 1970 by Sang-wuk 
Cho(ex-manager of KSC), respectively. As well as CEOs, KSC trained a 
large number of seamen and offered them with floating workplaces. 
Above all, KSC motivated the government to ratify the Act of fostering 
the shipping industry in February 1967. The Act was the turning-point for 
the government to take the shipping industry not as a burden but as the 
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means of creating national wealth. The Act included the flag 
discrimination, shipbuilding subsidy, cargo reserves, waiver system, 
subvention for international services, and tax exemptions. Although KSC 
was not able to enjoy any benefit provided under this Act, the Act 
functioned as the main engine for the rapid development of the Korean 
shipping industry. 
According to Michael Roe (2002), “shipping policy never emerges in 
any sector without interest groups(p.496).” If we apply this statement to 
the case of KSC, KSC could be established with the governmental interest 
not taking the financial burden and could be privatized with the political 
interest for evading the responsibility and/or the criticism from the 
political bribe donors. As Tae-woo Lee (1996) mentioned appropriately, 
“even politically motivated decisions such as the foundation of a national 
shipping company must not violate economic principles. That is, 
investment operations will always be at the expense of the State 
budget(p.4).” In other words, KSC could have existed at the expense of the 
national budget.  
KSC revealed numerous defects as a state-run company. First of all, five 
of the seven CEOs appointed by the government lacked professionalism, 
which led to the costly management of KSC. Sohn gave a few of the 
inefficient KSC management examples; 1̺  the excessive number of 
shore staff (37% as of 1963, compared with the average 20% of four 
Japanese companies), 2̺ the excessive expense of the general 
administrative costs (about two times higher than those of Japan during 
1960-62), 3̺  the enforcement of a low-wage policy for seamen (average 
6,770 Won per month for 221 seamen,  in comparison with 7,070 Won 
per month for 861 shore staff), 4̺  the prevalence of smuggling by 
seamen(Sohn, 1997, pp.357-360).  
But without KSC there would not be the Korean shipping industry today. 
In short, KSC was a bane in the short run but a boon in the long run for 
the government and also for Korea’s shipping industry. Park & Yee wrote 
that “shipping policy is not to foster the shipping companies and to 
develop the national shipping industry but to contribute to promote the 
welfare of the people and the national economy (Park et al, 1991, p.522).” 
But the case of KSC proves the above statement might be wrong or 
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sometimes contrary to the real world. In conclusion, we can say that a state-run 
enterprise tends to be a bane in the short run but a boon in the long run. 
As cited in section III, Goss and Marlow listed the theories of defending 
maritime policies as 6 categories. Which of these theories can apply in the 
case of KSC? The author supposes none of those can apply for the case of 
KSC if the above analysis is relevant. That’s why the main reason for 
founding and privatizing KSC cannot be included as one of 6 categories. 
Of course, KSC made use of the above 6 theories to get more 
governmental support after its establishment. Michael Roe categorized the 
five factors that drive shipping policy as; 1̺  historical perspective, 2̺
nodes, network and system, 3̺  modal choice, inter-modalism and 
flexibility, 4̺  deregulation and privatization and 5̺  holism. And he also 
presented the spatial levels of shipping policy as international, 
supra-national, national, regional and local origins and the contexts of 
shipping policy as political, economic, legal, managerial, technical, 
organizational, social, spatial, legal contexts(Roe, 2002). Considering the 
case of KSC, we can apply historical perspective, national level and 
political, social and economic contexts to the development of KSC and 
the shipping industry of Korea. 
Generally the negative opinion on the state-owned company is 
commonly shared among the scholars especially in advanced countries. On 
the other hand, those who are in underdeveloped or developing countries 
have positive view on the shipping promotion policy or the national 
shipping company. If we can believe KSC followed the ordinary sailing 
route as a state-run enterprise, we might develop a new opinion that the 
national shipping company in underdeveloped or developing countries 
might be a financial burden in a short period, but various benefits over a 
long period. This might contribute to reconsider the negative aspect of the 
state-run enterprise. 
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